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Developments: Recent Developments

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

Mecklenburg v. Montana State University
In Mecklenburg v. Montana State University, Civil No. 74-87-BU (D.
Mont. 1976), several female faculty members filed charges of discrimination against Montana State University with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Upon receiving "right to sue" letters, the women
filed an individual and class action discrimination suit in federal court,
basing their cause of action on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e and REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), § 41-1307. The court held
the defendant university had discriminated against women by underutilizing women in certain departments, and by applying inequitable standards
regarding salary, promotion, tenure and appointment of women to prominent university committees.

Procedurally, the court determined that the requirements of Rules
23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been satisfied, and that a class action was, therefore, appropriate. The court further
held that statistical evidence alone was sufficient both to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination against a class, and to rebut the defendant
employer's "pretext" showing of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer's action in an individual Title VII suit.
In holding that Montana State University had discriminated against
women as a class by underutilizing women, the court relied upon evidence
showing there were no female vice presidents or deans at the university,
nor any female assistant deans representing the various colleges within the
university. The court rejected the university's contention that there were
too few available women for those positions. The availability figures used
by the university were deemed too conservative because they were based
on the percentage of women doctorates, whereas over one-third of the
entire faculty at the university did not possess doctorate degrees.
The court also found women were discriminated against as a class in
the areas of promotion, tenure, salary and appointment to important university committees. The evidence regarding promotion decisions at the
university reflected usp of a nonstandardized merit system which left too
much room for subjective criteria. The court commented that, in the great
majority of cases, there were no women involved in the entire promotion
procedure. A recommendation for promotion began at the department
level and was thereafter channeled through the dean of the particular
college, the Promotion and Tenure Committee, the Personnel Committee,
the university president, and ultimately, the Board of Regents. At the
university, there were only two female department heads out of thirty-five,
no female deans, and no women on either the Promotion and Tenure or
Personnel Committees.
Discrimination against women was also found through a statistical
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comparison of males and females by professional degree at the university
which showed that a larger percentage of males reached the ranks of professor and associate professor than did females. Statistics highlighted the fact
that women spent longer time at a particular rank than did their male
counterparts. This disparity occurred although the females had the same
job experience as comparable males. In defense of the alleged discrimination in promotion and rank, the university maintained that women's careers were more limited by family obligations and that women were less
ambitious than men. The court summarily dismissed these contentions as
being "wholly conjecture."
The court determined that the university's tenure policy resulted in
disproportionately fewer women achieving tenure than men. This conclusion was based on the same facts which evidenced discrimination in promotion, because tenure at the university was intimately connected to promotion. Statistical analyses persuaded the court to find that female faculty members were likely to earn substantially less money than comparable males. Finally, the court found that women at the university had little
or no leadership roles on committees which formulate major fiscal, personnel and long range planning policy.
In the individual actions the court found the university had discriminated against two plaintiffs in regard to hiring and promotion. In both
instances the discrimination took the form of retaliation against the plaintiffs because of their activities on behalf of women, specifically, the filing
of discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court also determined two other plaintiffs had been discriminated against with regard to salary.
The court granted relief to the individual plaintiffs in the form of
damages, and granted damages and injunctive relief to the class. Because
of the issues raised and the significant procedural and substantive determinations made by the court, Mecklenburg stands as a landmark sex discrimination case in Montana.
Diane Rotering

"SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH" IN THE MONTANA AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
STATUTE

State v. Fuger
State v. Fuger, - Mont. -,
554 P.2d 1338 (1976), is the third
occasion on which the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the Criminal Code of 1973. The case confronts directly the question of what differentiates "aggravated" from "ordinary" assault under Chapter 5, Part 2 of the
Code. A radical narrowing of the concept of felony assault would have
resulted had the court construed the Code language strictly. Instead, the
court interpreted the crucial language broadly so that conduct traditionally considered felonious assault remains so.
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-202(1)(a) defines the aggravated assault offense
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11

2

19771

Developments:
Developments
RECENT Recent
DEVELOPMENTS

with which defendant Fuger was charged as "purposely or knowingly
caus[ing] serious bodily injury to another." The comparable category of
simple, or misdemeanor, assault is defined by R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5201(1)(a) as "purposely or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to another."
"Serious bodily injury," as distinguished from mere "bodily injury," is the
result which differentiates the offenses. The former subjects persons to
maximum prison sentences of twenty years, while the latter carries a maximum term of six months in the county jail. Thus, the question before the
court was what contitutes serious bodily injury.
In Fuger, defendant and his cousin were traveling along a narrow road
when they met the victim, accompanied by the cousin's ex-wife. A fight
over the ex-wife ensued, and the defendant was knocked unconscious.
When he revived, he saw the victim with a knife in his hand, sitting on
top of his cousin. He got up and kicked his victim several times in the face,
then kicked him again in the head while he lay in the snow. The victim
suffered severe bruises, a broken nose, and a split palate. Because doctors
feared the victim might have sustained dangerous head injuries, he was
under observation for several days. These fears proved groundless, however, and he recovered quickly. At Fuger's trial for aggravated assault, the
jury rejected his affirmative defense of justifiable use of force in defense of
another, and returned a verdict of guilty.
Several questions were raised on appeal, but the crucial issue was
whether Fuger committed aggravated assault within the meaning of
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-202 (1)(a).
Aggravated assault requires that an accused knowingly cause serious
bodily injury to another. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(54) defines "serious bodily injury" as follows: " 'Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or process
of any bodily member or organ. . . ." Neither party in its brief suggested
that the injuries of the victim might be described by the phrase "protracted loss or impairment of the function. . . of a bodily. . . organ," nor
did the supreme court mention this portion of the definition in its opinion.
Thus the court neglected entirely what was originally thought to be the
most elastic and potentially most encompassing language of subpart (54),
to concentrate instead on the phrase "substantial risk of death." This
omission was enigmatic and unfortunate: a broken nose and split palate
certainly are fairly describable as protracted functional impairments, but
would not ordinarily be considered potentially mortal injuries. By failing
to place the victim's injuries in a category where they naturally fell, the
court needed to strain to find that the State had sustained its burden of
proof of aggravated assault.
In his brief, the defendant contended that a person cannot be held to
have committed aggravated assault under the applicable language of subpart (54) unless he knowingly causes bodily injuries to another which in
fact create a substantial risk of death. The defendant Fuger did not inflict
this kind of injury. Testimony from the attending physician established
clearly that the victim in fact had never been placed in substantial risk of
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977
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death by his injuries, although the injuries were of such a character that
they could conceivably have done so. The defendant argued that in adopting the new Criminal Code, with its explicit definition of the term "serious
bodily injury," the legislature meant to abrogate the older common law
and statutory definition of felony assault-described traditionally as assault causing "grievous bodily harm"-and to narrow the scope of the new
offense to include only injuries which created in fact a substantial risk of
death.
The State, on the other hand, argued that the jury thought Fuger
committed felony assault, that the old common law standards apply, and
that the phrase "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death"
means "bodily injury which creates the appearanceor the possibility of a
substantial risk of death." Whether an injury created such risk, the State
contended, was for the jury to decide, as the phrase "substantial risk of
death" is not defined in the Code. Because testimony of the physician
clearly indicated that Fuger did cause injuries which created both the
appearance and the possibility of putting the victim in substantial risk of
death, the State concluded that Fuger was properly convicted.
In accepting the State's argument, the supreme court said:
The legislature has not defined "substantial risk of death" . . . . Injury
which creates a "substantial risk of death" is graver and more serious
[than "bodily injury", which means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition], and whether or not it has been established
by the evidence is generally a question of fact to be determined by the
jury.
State v. Fuger, - Mont. at -, 554 P.2d at 1340.
Unfortunately, the crucial language from the State's brief ("the possibility
and appearance of a substantial risk of death") was not used in the supreme court's opinion. The laconic textbook formulation "graver and more
serious," traditionally used to explicate the "grievous bodily harm"
standard, is the heart of the holding. The court discussed the attending
physician's testimony indicating that when the physician first examined
the victim, he felt that due to the nature of his injuries the victim was in
a potentially dangerous situation and might be facing a substantial risk of
death. From this the court infers that it was competent for the jury to find
that the victim had been placed in substantial risk of death. The emphasis
on the role of the jury re-establishes the traditional rule that it is for the
jury to decide whether the degree of injury shown by the evidence fits the
"serious bodily injury" criterion for felony assault.
Though one may feel uncomfortable with the strained and circuitous
character of this interpretation, the result reached is not without justification. The rule argued for by defendant, though seemingly the only one that
could be reached by confining oneself to the Code language, would be
entirely unworkable. It would focus the inquiry in an assault case on the
narrow circumstance of how severely a person was actually injured, rather
than on the character of the conduct that caused the injury.
The venerable Montana case of State v. Laughlin, 105 Mont. 490, 73
P.2d 718 (1937) provides an understanding of the traditional distinction
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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between felony and misdemeanor assault on which the Fuger court probably based its decision. It holds that an injury is to be described as "grievous" simply by contrast to one that is "slight or moderate"; and, addressing itself to some of the factors to be considered in evaluating the degree
of the crime, it comments: "A mere trespass upon the person of another
or a simple beating would clearly come under assault in the third degree
[misdemeanor assault]. Defendant's crime exceeded such an assault by
its ferocity, its maliciousness, and in the injuries suffered by the victim."
105 Mont. at 495-96, 73 P.2d at 720-21. Basically, Laughlin teaches that a
felony assault is a serious assault, and that the question of its severity is
to be determined by the jury. The focus of the jury's inquiry must be on
whether the nature of the assault is such as to inflict or threaten to inflict
serious harm to the one assailed.
The difficulties the court faced in State v. Fuger illustrate the pitfalls
that may be encountered by a state's borrowing some, but not all, of the
language of an integrated uniform or model code. The definition of "serious
bodily injury" in the Montana Criminal Code of 1973 is taken verbatim
from the Model Penal Code, § 210.0(3). The aggravated assault provision
of the Model Penal Code, however, subjects one to liability for aggravated
assault who "purposely or knowingly attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury". Model Penal Code, § 211.1(2)(a)
[emphasis supplied]. This use of "attempt" in a possibly different sense
than that in which it appears in the chapter on inchoate offenses,
prompted the Montana draftsmen to eliminate the first phrase from the
aggravated assault section of the Montana Code. In doing so, however,
they also eliminated the Model Code's coverage of substantially the same
conduct traditionally considered felony assault, and apparently narrowed
the range of conduct punishable as such. The Montana Supreme Court has
now given us to understand that this was not the intent of the legislature.
Charles W. Boggs

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERPRETATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

Montana Power Company v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
Many Montana practitioners are unfamiliar with strategies which are
useful when seeking judicial review of an administrative agency's interpretaton of its regulations. Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 34 St. Rptr. 30 (D.
Mont. Jan. 27, 1977) (order granting declaratory judgment), notice of appeal filed (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 1977), provides a good example of the considerations a lawyer must have in mind when appealing such administrative
action.
On May 23, 1976, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notified the Montana Power Company (MPC) that its proposed coal-fired
generating plants, Colstrip Three and Four, to be located at Colstrip,
Montana, were subject to pre-construction review under the provisions of
40 C.F.R. 52.21(d) (1975). Montana Power Company sought judicial review
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977
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of this determination in the United States District Court for the District
of Montana, Billings Division. The court denied MPC's request for a preliminary injunction, but granted its request for declaratory relief. It held
that the EPA's order of May 23, 1976, was arbitrary and capricious within
the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, §10e(2)(A), 5 U.S.C.
§706(2)(A) (1970); that MPC had commenced construction of Colstrip
Three and-Four prior to June 1, 1975, within the meaning of 40 C.F.R.
52.21(b)(7) (1975), and that Units Three and Four were therefore exempt
from pre-construction review. The EPA's motion for summary judgment
was denied. Montana Power Co., 34 St. Rptr. at 56. At the time of this
decision, MPC's request for a permanent injunction was still pending. It
has since been granted.
The facts of the case are extensive. On December 5, 1974, the EPA
promulgated regulations providing for pre-construction review of potential
pollution sources, including coal-fired generating plants, to determine if
the sources would violate regional clean air standards. The standards were
set out in the same regulations. 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974). The regulations
applied only to sources "commencing construction" on or after June 1,
1975. In March and May, 1975, the EPA had notified the Pacific Power
and Light Company and the Portland General Electric Company that each
of their proposed power plants was not subject to pre-construction review.
The EPA determined that the contracts for services and equipment into
which these companies entered prior to June 1, 1975, were such that the
companies had "commenced construction" on their plants. The MPC had
also contracted, prior to June 1, 1975, for services and equipment which
were similar in quality to those considered by the EPA in March and May.
On September 2, 1975, the EPA notified MPC that Colstrip Units
Three and Four might be subject to pre-construction review. In December,
1975, and April, 1976, before making its final determination on Colstrip
Three and Four, the EPA produced and circulated two memoranda within
the agency. These memoranda provided guidance as to how the phrase
"commencing construction" was to be interpreted. The criteria for determining whether a company had commenced construction differed considerably from those which the EPA used in making the Pacific Power and
Light and Portland General Electric decisions. The memoranda directed
that a company would not be found to have commenced construction, even
if it had entered into contracts for construction or equipment prior to June
1, 1975, if cancellation of those contracts would not cause a substantial loss
to the company.
On May 23, 1976, after considering information supplied to it by MPC,
the EPA found: a) MPC had not yet begun on-site construction; b) because
the State of Montana had not yet approved construction of Units Three
and Four, MPC had no authority to begin construction; c) without such
permission, MPC had planned and had made commitments at its own risk;
and d) regardless of the first three findings, the contractual commitments
made by MPC were insubstantial as they constituted only 2.8 percent
($22.3 million) of the total predicted cost of Colstrip Units Three and Four.
The EPA concluded that MPC had not commenced construction within
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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the meaning of 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(7) (1975).
The most notable part of the case is the way in which the petitioners
attacked the order. MPC sought judicial review under the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). It did not assert
that the EPA's findings were arbitrary and capricious; it asserted that the
change in policy upon which the decision was based was arbitrary and
capricious. This contention had several advantages. The court was not
required to give great deference to the EPA's findings as technical interpretations within the agency's, but not the court's, expertise. The findings
were supported by facts, so there could be no assertion that they were
unsubstantiated. The findings were arguably within the scope of the regulations as well.
This form of attack gave the court an opening through which it could
intervene, not only in the agency's substantive decision, but in the
agency's policy-making procedure as well. As the court said:
Courts are not wont to interfere with agency policy decisions for that is
beyond the realm of judicial review. However, the question of fairness
arises when a policy based on the apparently plain meaning of regulatory
language is reinterpreted after the fact to read into the plain language
requirements which are not on the face of the regulations. When the reinterpretation amounts to a policy change, it is the prerogative of the Courts
to examine the record to see if there is a justifiable reason for the policy
change. In this case, there is none.
Montana Power Co., 34 St. Rptr. at 54.
The court easily hurdled the only obstacle in its path, the rule that a
court should give great deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. It found that the EPA's Pacific Power and Light and Portland
General Electric decisions were interpretations of its regulations upon
which MPC was entitled to, and did, rely. The later interpretations, the
court said, were based on an agency policy which arose between the time
of its first interpretations and its final decision in this case, but after MPC
was notified of possible pre-construction review. They were, in effect, a
retroactive change in the application of the regulations, a change which
was unfair to MPC.
MPC, through careful choice of its strategy, thus avoided the defenses
which administrative agencies historically have employed against challenges to their orders.
Jeffrey T. Renz

VENDOR'S REPRESENTATIONS MADE OUTSIDE THE CONTRACT FOR DEED HELD

AGAINST HIM
Bails v. Gar
In Bails v. Gar, - Mont. -, 558 P.2d 458 (1976), the Montana
Supreme Court held that a provision in a contract for deed which stated
that the buyers had inspected the premises and disclaimed reliance on the
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977
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seller's representations as inducements to purchase a ranch did not preclude the buyers, in an action for fraud, from proving that they had relied
on the prior oral representations.
The plaintiffs were Michigan residents who were interested in purchasing a ranch. Richard Bails was a factory worker, and his wife Patricia
was a school teacher. They contacted a South Dakota realtor to help them
find a ranch in Montana. The defendant, Stan Gar, listed his ranch with
the same realtor.
Bails flew to Montana to see the ranch, located near Three Forks, and
was taken on a tour of the property by Gar. Gar told Bails he could make
$50,000 to $100,000 on grain alone. The next day Bails went on a second
tour of the ranch, this time with Gar, Richardson (the South Dakota realtor), and Norman Wheeler, a local realtor who many years earlier had
appraised the ranch and had later sold it to Gar. Richardson told Bails that
he could make $100,000 per year income from the ranch; Wheeler, the local
realtor, cut that figure to $80,000 per year. Bails signed a "Receipt and
Agreement to Sell and Purchase" the same morning. He was in possession
of the ranch for a month before he executed the formal contract for deed.
During the following year Bails became dissatisfied with the ranch and
sued Gar for fraudulent representations.
The plaintiffs claimed Gar made five misrepresentations: (1) that the
ranch would raise and sustain 400 animal units; (2) that the ranch
consisted of approximately 5,200 deeded acres; (3) that the ranch had 300
acres of hayland which produced 900 tons of hay per year; (4) that there
were 600 acres of cropland which produced 21 bushels of grain per acre;
and (5) that the property would produce income of at least $80,000 per
year. The first four of these representations allegedly appeared in a brochure which was included in the ranch listing Gar gave to Richardson.
The defendants contended that the plaintiffs had not relied upon
these representations in making the purchase. Bails had toured the ranch
twice and had made inquires about the ranching operation. In addition,
the contract for deed provided:
13. Vendees have fully inspected the premises and are familiar therewith
and enter into this agreement by reason of their own inspection and judgment and acknowledge that there are no inducements to purchase said
property by reason of any representations on the part of the Vendors or
persons acting by, through or for said Vendors. . . . (emphasis added).
Defendants maintained that under the circumstances, the contract provision estopped Bails from suing on representations made outside the contract for deed.
The Montana court responded emphatically. Generally fraud will vitiate a contract even though it contains a provision that no representations
have been made as an inducement to enter into it, or that neither party is
bound by any representation not contained therein. Such provisions do not
preclude a charge of fraud based on oral representations. Public policy and
mor'ality would be offended if the court gave effect to such an agreement.
The court followed Goggans v. Winkely, 154 Mont. 451, 465 P.2d 328, 330
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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(1970), which held that a similar contract for deed provision did not preclude proof that prior oral representations were in fact relied upon. In
reversing the summary judgment, the supreme court held that as a matter
of law the exculpatory clause in the contract for deed did not estop Bails'
action for fraud. Bails v. Gar, - Mont. at -, 558 P.2d at 462.
The Bails decision also elucidated another important element in a
fraud action. Defendants contended that Bails had no right to rely on the
alleged representations either because he investigated the facts for himself
or because he had the means to ascertain the truth. Normally a party who
investigates for himself, or who has the means at hand to ascertain the
truth of any representations, cannot later claim he relied upon those representations, no matter how false. Lowe v. Root, 166 Mont. 150, 156, 531 P.2d
674, 677 (1975).
The court focused, however, on the nature of Bails' investigation and
on the means he had available to ascertain the truth. Bails had little or
no experience in ranching, and "he was new to the country." The court
held that the shortcomings of which he complained, including acreage and
productivity, were of such a nature that a man of his experience could not
be held as a matter of law to have the means at hand to discover the truth.
Bails v. Gar, - Mont. at -, 558 P.2d at 462. The court distinguished
Bails from two other Montana cases in which the deficiencies were open
and notorious and would have been revealed by a superficial inspection.
Lowe v. Root, 166 Mont. 150, 531 P.2d 674 (1975); Grindrod v. AngloAmerican Bond Co., 34 Mont. 169, 85 P. 891 (1906).
The Bails decision thus adds strength to the proposition that a plaintiff may introduce parol evidence of fraudulent representations on which
he relied, regardless of a contract provision stating that the plaintiff has
not relied on inducements made outside the contract. Additionally, in an
action for fraud, where the plaintiff has had an opportunity to investigate
the representations made to him, the court must examine the circumstances to determine whether the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge or experience to make his investigation meaningful.
James C. Kilbourne

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MONTANA'S PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT STATUTES

Bustell v. Bustell
Williams v. Matovich
Prejudgment attachment of property in Montana is governed entirely

by statute.

REVISED CODES OF MONTANA

(1947), §§ 93-4301 to -4347. A

creditor obtains a writ of attachment by filing an ex parte affidavit with
the clerk of court stating that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for
a stated sum, and by giving a written undertaking. The clerk of court issues
the writ which directs the sheriff to take custody of some or all of the
defendant's assets in order to secure payment of the debtor's obligation.
The sheriff then seizes or levies upon the property; no notice or opportunity
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1977
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to be heard need be given to the debtor prior to the attachment. The debtor
can obtain the release of the property seized or levied upon prior to the
resolution of the underlying dispute by posting a bond, by moving the court
to discharge the attachment on the grounds that it was improperly or
irregularly issued, or by vacating or modifying the writ any time before the
actual application of the attached property to the payment of the judgment.
For a long period of time such procedures were accepted by American
courts without challenge. The picture changed dramatically in 1969 when
the United States Supreme Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), declared prejudgment garnishment of wages without
prior notice and hearing to be unconstitutional under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In
two subsequent cases, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (consumer
goods) and North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem. Inc., 419 U.S. 600
(1974) (bank account), the Supreme Court held prejudgment attachments
of property without prior notice and hearing to be unconstitutional; however, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (consumer goods),
they were held to be constitutional if there were other procedural safeguards which satisfied due process.
Relying upon these United States Supreme Court decisions, the Montana Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutional problems raised
by Montana's prejudgment attachment law. In Bustell v. Bustell,
Mont. -, 555 P.2d 722 (1976), plaintiff Clarice L. Bustell commenced
an action against defendants William B. Bustell and Shirley A. Bustell to
collect an overdue and unpaid promissory note for $8000, interest, and
attorney fees. At the same time, she also filed an affidavit for a writ of
attachment and posted the necessary undertaking. The clerk of court issued the writ to the sheriff who attached the interest of the defendant
Shirley Bustell in a house owned by defendants by filing a copy of the writ
and notice of attachment with the county clerk and recorder; such attachment constitutes a lien against the real estate under Montana law. Defendants received no notice prior to issuance or levy of the writ of attachment.
On the basis of Sniadach and its progeny, defendant Shirley Bustell filed
a counterclaim against the plaintiff, alleging that the attachment of her
real estate was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due
process of law. The district court dismissed her motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Montana attachment statutes effect a constitutional accomodation of the conflicting interests of the parties and therefore
satisfy procedural due process. Subsequently, the district court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff, striking the counterclaim of defendant
Shirley Bustell.
The lien in Bustell differs from the type of creditors' remedies involved
in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia in that it attaches to
real rather than personal property, and does not affect the owner's possessory interest. Instead, the lien affects the owner's ability to dispose of his
property at full value. The lien creates a cloud on the debtor's title, and
thereby reduces the amount of money that an owner may obtain from the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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sale or mortgage of the land.
In determining the character of the property deprivation caused by the
lien in Bustell, and whether it is within the protection of the due process
clause under the line of the Supreme Court decisions on prejudgment
attachments, the Montana Supreme Court relied on In re Northwest
Homes of Chehalis, Inc., v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976), and Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974). Northwest
Homes held that when only real property is attached and when issuance
or execution of the writ of attachment does not deprive defendant of ownership, actual use or physical possession of the attached property, there is
no substantial taking of the property within the protection of the due
process clause. Spielman held that the filing of a nonpossessory mechanics'
and materialmen's lien against real property is not such a significant taking of a property interest that prior notice and an opportunity to challenge
the lien in a prior hearing are required by the due process clause. Reasoning
that there is no substantial or significant taking of property by virtue of
the lien, and noting that the Montana attachment statutes do provide the
owner with the remedy of an early hearing, the Montana Supreme Court
held that the prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice
and hearing is constitutional, thus affirming the lower court's decision.
In Williams v. Matovich, 34 St. Rptr. 124 (1977), the Montana attachment statutes were held unconstitutional as applied to wage garnishments.
The plaintiff Williams purchased groceries on credit from defendant Matovich, pursuant to an oral agreement. Upon failure to pay, Matovich
initiated suit in state court against Williams for the grocery debt in the
sum of $157.34. Matovich applied for a writ of attachment at the time the
summons was issued. The clerk of court issued the writ which the sheriff
presented to Williams' employer. Williams' employer then gave the sheriff
a check drawn from Williams' wages for the entire amount allegedly due
and owing in the complaint. Williams filed a countersuit in federal district
court,alleging that the attachment constituted a denial of due process. The
question certified to the Montana Supreme Court from the federal district
court under Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure was
whether the Montana writ of attachment statutes, as applied, violated due
process.
The Montana Supreme Court responded affirmatively. It found
Sniadach to be the controlling authority for the factual situation in Williams. In both cases, wages were attached pursuant to a writ issued by a
clerk of court, at the request of a creditor, without notice or an opportunity
to be heard prior to the attachment. Sniadach had stressed that wages are
a specialized type of property, deserving special protection in our economic
system because their taking can cause severe hardship to the wage earner.
395 U.S. at 340. The court also held that even if Sniadachwere not controlling, the Montana statutes would still be unconstitutional as applied,
because the procedural safeguards deemed constitutionally necessary
under Mitchell were lacking. The Mitchell writ of sequestration issued
upon an affidavit stating more than simple conclusory allegations that a
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debt was owed; in Montana no showing of such specific facts was required
by statute. Mitchell also required judicial supervision for issuance of the
writ while the Montana statute permitted the clerk of court to issue the
writ. In Mitchell, the defendant had only to file his motion to dismiss and
the burden to prove the facts substantiating the writ was placed on the
plaintiff; in Montana, the statutes required the defendant to carry the
burden of proving that the writ was improperly or irregularly issued. Additionally, the opportunity for a pre-seizure hearing supposedly provided
under Montana attachment statutes is illusory, since the defendant is
generally unaware that a writ has been issued until the property is seized.
The recent Montana cases of Bustell v. Bustell and Williams v.
Matovich make it clear that Montana's attachment statutes are constitutional in regard to prejudgment attachment of real estate, but unconstitutional in regard to prejudgment garnishment of wages. Prejudgment attachment of wages and personal property must be preceded by notice and
hearing to be valid.
Susan M. Lacosta

RIPARIAN RIGHTS WITHIN INDIAN RESERVATIONS

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen
United States v. Finch
Two recent federal court decisions clarify the rights of persons who
own land adjacent to navigable waters on the Flathead and Crow Indian
Reservations. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 380 F.
Supp. 452 (D. Mont. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 336 and United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir.
1976) together establish that the owners of waterfront property on these
reservations possess the common law rights of access and wharfage to the
navigable waters, but do not have an unregulated right to recreational
fishing.
Defendant Namen and his relatives owned property bordering Flathead Lake within the Flathead Reservation. They were the successors in
interest to an Indian allottee who originally receive a patent on the land
under the Indian Allotment Act of 1904, 33 Stat. 302, and subsequent
amendments. Namen operated a marina at the site and maintained docks,
wharves, piers and other facilities which extended beyond the high water
mark and upon the bed and bank of Flathead Lake. Because significant
property interests were affected, the city of Polson, Montana (located
within the reservation), was permitted to intervene in Namen and a coalition of other riparian owners filed as amicus curiae.
In a tightly reasoned opinion which was later adopted by the Ninth
Circuit, Judge Jameson determined that federal common law, and not
statute or tribal law, governed any riparian rights associated with Namen's
property. Although title to the beds of navigable water courses usually
passes to the State upon admission to the Union, the court recognized an
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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exception where the United States has reserved title to itself in trust for
the tribes. Therefore, state law was not controlling. Likewise, the court
rejected the tribes' claim that tribal law controlled. Since the tribes did
not receive legal title to the lake bed, the court found the tribes' position
to be analogous to that of territories. The court also found that the paramount authority of the Congressional actions allotting the reservation
lands overrides this application of retained tribal sovereignty.
The court thus determined that the crucial issue was one of statutory
construction: "[Wihether [the acts alloting the reservation], when
viewed in the context of long established common law principles governing
riparian rights, indicate that Congress intended the grants of riparian
lands pursuant to the allotment acts to convey the rights of access and
wharfage." 380 F. Supp. at 461. The court noted the existence of a line of
cases requiring narrow construction of statutes in derogation of Indian
property rights. However, after reviewing the applicable treaties, statutes,
and cases, the court determined that Congress had intended "to exercise
its dominant power over Indian lands. . . ." The court concluded that
"[w]here the United States holds land in trust for Indian Tribes, federal
common law is applicable to a determination of the extent of a federal
grant despite the lack of any express Congressional language to that effect." 380 F. Supp. at 466. The court then ruled that under long-standing
principles of federal common law, the non-Indian riparian owners along the
south half of Flathead Lake were entitled as a matter of law to rights of
access and wharfage.
United States v. Finch arose from a controversy involving the authority asserted by the Crow Tribe to control hunting and fishing within reservation boundaries. James Junior Finch stood on the bank of the Big Horn
River at a point within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation and cast a fishing lure into its waters. The State of Montana owned
the bank at that spot as a successor in interest through chain of title to a
Crow Indian who had received the land by allotment. Finch was licensed
to fish by the State. Finch was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor
-offense of trespassing on Indian lands in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1165
(1970).
In reversing the decision of the district court, the Ninth Circuit initially determined that the appeal by the United States was not barred by
double jeopardy. Reaching the merits of the appeal, the court felt the
threshold issue was the ownership of the riverbed of the Big Horn River.
If, as the defendant contended, the title to the bed had passed to the state
upon admission to the Union, no offense would have been committed as
there would be no entry upon Indian land.
In resolving the issue in Finch, the court of appeals contrasted two
Supreme Court opinions that ruled on title to the lands beneath navigable
waters situated in Indian country, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S.
620 (1969) and United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). The
court of appeals chose to follow the Choctaw Nation case which relied on
an examination of treaty negotiations and events ancillary to the drafting
of treaty language in order to discover the government's intentions. After
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examining the negotiations and background of the 1851 and 1868 treaties
with the Crow Tribe, the court of appeals decided that the federal government had intended that the tribe receive exclusive rights to the reservation
lands, including the rights in the riverbed.
After rejecting a claim by defendant that title to the riverbed turned
on the tribe's historical reliance on fishing for sustenance, the court of
appeals addressed the defendant's contention that he had a riparian right
to fish from the bank regardless of ownership of the bed. Although the
court found little guidance in federal common law even as to the existence
of a riparian right to fish, the court did not think the existence of the right
was determinative. The court held that a riparian right to fish is subject
to regulation and that such a regulatory power had been exercised:
[T]he authority to withhold permission to enter for fishing, hunting, or
trapping has been expressly conferred on the tribe by the promulgation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1165, an enactment clearly within the national power. The
language and the history of 18 U.S.C. § 1165 show that the right of Indians
to control hunting, trapping, and fishing on their lands is a prerogative of
ownership which the United States recognizes as a matter of federal law.
Finch, 548 F.2d at 834.
Both Finch and Namen dictate that the determination of the rights
of riparian landowners within Indian reservations requires a thorough examination of the federal statutes and treaties which establish the reservation and regulate its subsequent use.

TIME OF ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY

Bretz v. Crist
In Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held
that the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn is
applicable to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This determination rendered unconstitutional REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA (1947), § 95-1711(3)(d), which provided that jeopardy does not
attach until "after the first witness is sworn."
Appellants Bretz and Cline were named in a multiple-count information in which Count I charged grand larceny and Count II charged obtaining money and property by false pretenses. Six other counts were fragments of the alleged criminal conduct in Counts I and II. A ninth count,
alleging the presentation of false proofs upon a policy of insurance, was
dismissed before the first prosecution commenced.
Because of a typographical error as to the time of commission of the
acts alleged in Count II, (1974 instead of 1973) Count II failed to state an
offense. The relevant statute had been repealed, effective January 1, 1974.
Following the impaneling and swearing of the jury, but preceding the
offering of evidence, defense counsel moved to restrict the State's evidence
as to the allegations of Count H. The state resisted, and moved to amend
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/11
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Count II to correct the typographical error. The trial court denied this
motion and sua sponte dismissed Count II for failing to state an offense.
After the Montana Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of supervisory
control, the State moved to dismiss the remaining counts in order to file a
new and different information. The trial court granted this motion.
On the same day, the State filed a second, two-count information,
Count I being identical to the first count of the previous information and
Count II repeating the prior Count II in all respects except for the correction of the typographical error. A new jury was impaneled, appellants'
motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy was denied, and appellants were found guilty of obtaining money by false pretenses. After exhausting available state post-conviction remedies, appellants sought and
were denied habeas corpus relief by the United States District Court for
the District of Montana. Cunningham v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 430
(D. Mont. 1975) (consolidated cases). See Note, State v. Cunninghamand
Montana's Rule on Double Jeopardy, 37 MONT. L. REV. 238, 249 (1976).
In reversing the federal district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
relied on Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). In Benton, the United
States Supreme Court held that "the double jeopardy prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional
heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment." Benton, 395 U.S. at 794. Once it is determined that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is "a fundamental ideal," it is then necessary
to inquire whether state procedure satisfied due process of law. Given the
fundamental nature of the right (protection against double jeopardy), is a
particular procedure (time of attachment of jeopardy) essential to the
protection of that right? Or, as the Ninth Circuit queried, is the federal
attachment-of-jeopardy rule "a product of constitutional exegesis or simply a nonconstitutional consequence of the Supreme Court's supervisory
power over the federal courts and federal officials." Bretz, 546 F.2d at 1340.
If the state procedure-that jeopardy does not attach until "after the
first witness is sworn"-is controlling, the Bretz petitioners were never put
in jeopardy by the first prosecution on the original information. If, however, the federal procedure is of "constitutional dimension", then jeopardy
attached at the first prosecution because federal procedure provides that
jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn. Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
The court held that the federal attachment-of-jeopardy rule is indeed
of constitutional dimension and "is binding on the states as well as the
federal government." Bretz, 546 F.2d at 1343. The court reasoned, perhaps
too broadly, that "[e]ach time the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been interpreted to encoipass a particular guarantee of
the Bill of Rights, the [Supreme] Court has explicitly reaffirmed the
proposition that the same constitutional norms are to be employed in
assessing the conduct of state and federal authorities." Bretz, 546 F.2d at
1340 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Pointer v. Texas,
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380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963)).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has
consistently applied the federal attachment-of-jeopardy rule to state cases,
citing Somerville and Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Though neither
of those cases unequivocally specified that the federal attachment-ofjeopardy rule applied to the States, the Ninth Circuit correctly reasoned
that they leave little room for contrary argument. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit pointed out that the three other courts of appeals which have
considered the time-of-attachment question have held the task of defining
attachment of jeopardy to be a federal constitutional task. United States
ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773, 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1008 (1973); Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1113 (1973); and United States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois, 447
F.2d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1971), reversed on other grounds, 410 U.S. 458
(1973).
The conclusion that jeopardy has attached only begins the inquiry
whether the double jeopardy clause bars retrial. Not every declaration of
mistrial prevents re-prosecution, for "a defendant's valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances
be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just
judgments." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). A declaration of
mistrial is proper, and retrial is thus permitted, when "there is manifest
necessity for the [declaration], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 580
(1824). Adhering to the historic Perez rationale, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the dismissal of the original information, which resulted in
mistrial, prohibited re-prosecution under the second information. The
court reasoned there was no "manifest necessity" for dismissing Count I
of the original information as it contained no defect and was sufficient to
state an offense. The sole discernible purpose behind the State's motion
for dismissal of the entire information was the State's convenience in litigating the case as a unit. "In these circumstances, the mistrial and retrial
on Count I amounted to archetypal double jeopardy violation." Bretz, 546
F.2d at 1347 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971)). The Ninth
Circuit determined further that the dismissal of Count II of the original
information (the count containing the typographical error) also prevented
retrial on the ground that there was no manifest necessity. The court
reached this conclusion by relying on the analyses of Downum, Jorn, and
Somerville. Somerville was particularly pertinent, for in that case the
United States Supreme Court held that dismissal of a defective indictment
was proper because Illinois criminal procedure prevented amendment of
the indictment. The dismissal resulted in a mistrial, the declaration of
which satisfied the "manifest necessity" requirement, because mistrial
was the only way in which the defective indictment could be corrected.
Thus, the second prosecution in Somerville was permissible.
By contrast, the Montana statute specifically provided for the "formal" amendment of an information "any time before verdict." REVISED
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(1947), § 95-1505. As the amendment of a typographical error, such as in Count II of the original information, would be merely
a "formal" amendment, the trial court's failure to grant the State's motion
for amendment was an abuse of discretion. The subsequent dismissal of
the remaining counts in the original information, at the State's urging, was
therefore an improper declaration of mistrial that rendered the second
prosecution unconstitutional under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. On April 25, 1977, the United States Supreme Court granted
the State's request for a writ of certiorari as to defendant Cline.
CODES OF MONTANA

Diane Rotering
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